On North Korean reaction to the Soviet South Korean thaw: I’ve made it quite clear that we do not want the North Koreans to be further isolated … I do not expect North Korea to take any drastic military actions. But on the very remote chance that something might happen, we have taken all precautionary measures and we’ll try to maintain a watertight security posture. I think the North Koreans will experience some shock but in the future they will recover their reason. Eventually they will follow the trends of history.
On pressure to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea: I can understand that such sentiment will grow in the United States, but the fact is that [South] Korean-Soviet detente does not necessarily mean changes in North Korea. Until North Korea abandons its military scheme for conquest of the whole country, and until [its] military superiority is corrected, there will be obvious danger.
On the rise of regional powers like Japan: We have to be careful about that, and we have to learn from the lessons of history. Look at the post-World War II period when America withdrew. There was a vacuum, and [the Korean War] resulted from that vacuum. Although there will be some detente and some improvement of the security situation, I hope and trust that the United States … will maintain its necessary presence.
On U.S. relations with the North: In principle I have no objection [to U.S.-North Korean rapprochement] but there are some absolutely essential preconditions. North Korea has maintained a very hostile attitude toward the South. On the Korean Peninsula it has maintained an enormous military, deployed offensively … And internationally [it] has been engaging in various terrorist and subversive activities. If North Korea abandons such activities and attitudes, and if there is true openness and reform … the relationship of the United States or any other country with North Korea can improve.
On how the Soviets can influence North Korea: There wasn’t any detailed discussion on this point in my meeting with President Gorbachev. But we know that North Korea depends a lot on Soviet supplies for their military equipment, and in that respect [Moscow] has substantial leverage on North Korea. On the economic side, I think because of the economic difficulties that the Soviets themselves are undergoing, their influence will be limited. But overall … there will be increased efforts to reduce tension in Korea.
On North Korea after leader Kim II Sung: As you know, Kim II Sung has ruled North Korea singlehandedly for the past 42 years. Under those circumstances, there is little chance that the Gorbachevian movement for reform and openness will affect the North Korean attitude in the near future. But in this modern age no country can erect watertight walls against the outside world. Something is bound to seep into even that very tight isolation. We don’t know when it will happen, but eventually North Korea will start to crack and will start to open up. We cannot be too optimistic about this, but once Kim Il Sung is out of the picture whoever succeeds him will be quite different.
